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Abstract
During the last decade there has been extensive international research on the
responsiveness of wages of individuals to changing local labour market conditions.
For many countries, an inverse relationship between wages and local unemployment
rates has been found. In their 1994 book, The Wage Curve, Blanchflower and Oswald
argued that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around -0.1 in most countries. In a
1995 literature survey, Card referred to this striking empirical regularity as being
close to an ‘empirical law of economics’.  Nonetheless, reported elasticities do vary,
even excluding outliers, between about -0.5 and +0.1. There is also considerable
heterogeneity among wage curve studies in terms of data and model specification.
This paper carries out meta-analytic techniques on a sample of 208 elasticities derived
from the literature to uncover the reasons for the differences in empirical results
across studies. Several causes of variation are identified. There is also clear evidence
of downward publication bias. In addition, many reported t statistics are biased
upwards due to the use of aggregate unemployment rates. A maximum likelihood
method and a trimming procedure are used to correct for these biases. Both methods
give similar results for our sample. An unbiased estimate of the wage curve elasticity
at the means of study characteristics is about -0.07.
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1THE LAST WORD ON THE WAGE CURVE?
A META-ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT
1. Introduction
A promising development in economic research is the growing potential for a
comparative assessment of a set of empirical case studies on a particular research
issue. Seminal and path-breaking empirical contributions have usually instigated
many additional research articles on the same issue. In order to assess if some general
conclusions can be drawn from a large body of empirical findings, some type of
research synthesis is needed. Conventionally such a synthesis takes the form of a
narrative literature survey, but increasingly such surveys are complemented by
quantitative methods that are used to investigate differences in results across studies.
Following Glass (1976), such quantitative methods are now commonly referred to as
meta-analysis.1
Meta-analysis has become well established in the experimental sciences (see,
for example, Cooper and Hedges’ 1994 handbook), but has recently been growing in
popularity in economics.2 Stanley (2001) provides an overview and concludes that this
form of research synthesis can enhance conventional narrative literature surveys
considerably.
In this paper we adopt a meta-analytic approach to an empirical issue that has
attracted much attention during the last decade, namely the responsiveness of the
wages of individuals to local labour market conditions. The impetus for this research
was a 1990 article by David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald in which these authors
reported an inverse relationship, derived from micro level British and U.S. data,
between the real wage paid to individuals and the unemployment rate in local labour
markets. There had been earlier studies that investigated such a relationship with
micro-data,3 but Blanchflower and Oswald’s 1990 article and their subsequent 1994
book achieved prominence by careful and extensive replication of this research with
1 Glass referred to innovative and path-breaking studies, in terms of the theoretical model or estimation
techniques, as primary analysis. Secondary analysis consists of the replication of a specific model with
data from other time periods or cross-sectional units. The increasingly common practice to make data
electronically available to other researchers has also encouraged re-analysis of existing studies to assess
the robustness of primary results to the choice of assumptions and specifications. Such re-analysis may
also be referred to as secondary analysis. Arulampalam et al. (1997) and others emphasized the
importance of such replication and re-analysis in labour market research. Research synthesis in the
form of meta-analysis can be referred to as tertiary analysis in Glass’ classification.
2 Using an EconLit search and other sources, we estimate that the total number of published
applications of meta-analysis in economics is now around one hundred.
2different data sets and by their discovery that the unemployment elasticity of pay
turned out to be very similar across a wide range of countries and time periods,
namely about -0.1.
Thus, their research suggests that a worker may, on average, expect to earn 1
percent less in real terms when the unemployment rate in the local labour market
during a recession increases by 10 percent, ceteris paribus. Blanchflower and Oswald
(1990) called this inverse relationship between the wage of an individual and the local
unemployment rate ‘the wage curve’.
Research of this type provides a bridge between empirical macroeconomics
and microeconomics in that it derives a stylised fact regarding the ‘representative’
worker by means of microeconomic data. Their research on the wage curve led
several others to investigate the wage curve in different countries or for different time
periods. On the whole, these studies tended to confirm the existence of this
relationship, even to the extent that Card (1995, p.798) concluded in his review of the
literature that the wage curve “may be close to an ‘empirical law of economics’”.
Following Card’s narrative literature survey, further wage curve investigations were
undertaken and perhaps close to one thousand estimates of the relationship exist at
present. Thus, the wage curve would appear an obvious subject for meta-analysis,
although it is not the first topic in labour economics that has been studied by means of
this form of research synthesis.4
The main reason for the interest in the wage curve is not the magnitude of the
relationship: the observed elasticity implies rather small changes in real wages in
response to fairly large fluctuations in slackness of the local labour market as
measured by the unemployment rate. Instead, the wage curve has drawn attention
primarily due to the fact that it suggests evidence of imperfectly competitive wage
determination. At the micro-level, firms do not appear to be wage takers, but adjust
the wages paid downward when the local unemployment rate increases. There may be
of course various reasons why individual firms could face upward sloping supply
curves. The causes and implications of firms acting as local monopsonists, or being
engaged in monopsonistic competition in the case of costless entry, have attracted
3 Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) reported 16 other studies of this issue between 1985 and 1990.
4 Other examples in labour economics include Card and Krueger (1995) and Neumark and Wascher
(1998) on minimum wage effects, Jarrell and Stanley (1990) on the union-nonunion wage gap,
Doucouliagos (1995) on the effects of union participation on productivity, Doucouliagos (1997) on the
aggregate demand for labour, Fuller and Hester (1998) on union participation, Stanley and Jarrell
(1998) on the gender wage gap, and Ashenfelter et al. (1999) and Groot and Maassen van den Brink
(2000) on education issues.
3considerable interest in recent years; see e.g. Abraham (1996), Boal and Ransom
(1997) and Bhaskar and To (1999).
Since much of the empirical wage curve research uses pooled cross-section
time-series data, another interesting aspect of this research is the variation in wage
curve elasticities between different groups of workers, for different time periods and
at different locations.5 As Card (1995, p.794) suggested, the systematic variation in
the slope of the wage curve across groups of workers and sectors might be a very
useful way of choosing between various theories. However, few have as yet
responded to this call for explicit wage curve theory testing.6 The next section
provides a brief review of theoretical explanations for the wage curve and some of the
common findings in disaggregated analyses.
Meta-analysis provides a means of explaining the diversity in study results in
relation to the heterogeneity of study features. It may also help to choose between the
various theoretical explanations. In addition, it provides summary facts on the basis of
statistical criteria. Section 3 reviews the variation across empirical studies of the wage
curve in terms of observed study characteristics and the estimated elasticities. We
provide descriptive statistics, and compute means and confidence intervals of the
unemployment elasticity of pay under fixed and random effect models. However, a
simple test of homogeneity of sample observations is rejected.
In Section 4 we identify the main causes of heterogeneity by means of meta-
regression models. A problem with estimating this type of regression model is that it
can only take account of reported results, either in the published literature or
unpublished working papers. Samples of such results are usually subject to a selection
bias: the studies that are reported in the literature are more likely to demonstrate a
significant effect than would be the case if all studies on the key parameter would
have been published. Journals are more likely to accept manuscripts that reject the
null hypothesis of ‘no effect’ than manuscripts that do not have a ‘strong’ conclusion.
Thus, the mean parameter estimate derived from a sample of studies is likely to be a
biased estimate of the underlying population mean. This bias is referred to as
‘publication’, ‘reporting’ or ‘file drawer’ bias (see Ashenfelter et al. 1999).
We assess to what extent insignificant estimates of the wage curve elasticity
are likely to have been underrepresented in our sample and in the available literature.
We find that there is clear evidence of publication bias and calculate a bias-corrected
5 However, repeated observations on the same individuals are in this context rarely used.
4average of the unemployment elasticity of pay by means of maximum likelihood
estimation of a probabilistic model and by means of a sample trimming procedure.
Both methods give almost identical results. At the means of study characteristics, the
bias-corrected unemployment elasticity of pay is about -0.07. For macro simulation
models in need of a stylised fact on the wage curve, this would be a more accurate
number to insert than the previous consensus estimate of -0.1. The final section sums
up.
2. What can explain the wage curve?
As noted in the introduction, Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), using U.S. and British
micro data, were among the first to find evidence for an inverse relationship between
the level of pay of individuals and the local unemployment rate. Subsequently, they
reported on additional evidence for the wage curve in their 1994 book using data on
individuals from a wide range of countries.7 The robustness of their finding has been
confirmed by other investigators using similar data (for example, Blackaby and Hunt
1992; Groot et al. 1992; Winter-Ebmer 1996; Bratsberg and Turunen 1996; Janssens
and Konings 1998; Baltagi and Blien 1998; Kennedy and Borland 2000; and Baltagi
et al. 2000).  Several time-series studies (Johansen 1997; Chiarini and Piselli 1997)
also suggested a long-run inverse relationship between the wage level and
unemployment.3DUWLFXODUO\ VWULNLQJ LQ WKLV UHVHDUFK LV WKH ILQGLQJ DOUHDG\ DOOXGHG WR LQ WKHLQWURGXFWLRQ WKDW WKH HODVWLFLW\ RI WKH UHVSRQVLYHQHVV RI SD\ WR WKH ORFDOXQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH DSSHDUV WREH UREXVW DQG YHU\ VLPLODU DFURVV FRXQWULHV DQG WLPHSHULRGV QDPHO\ DERXW  2I FRXUVH WKHUH LV VRPH YDULDWLRQ 7DEOH  LQ &DUG¶VUHYLHZLQFOXGHVHVWLPDWHVUDQJLQJEHWZHHQDQGZKLOH7DEOHLQWKH QH[W VHFWLRQ RI WKLV SDSHU UHSRUWV HVWLPDWHV EHWZHHQ  DQG  7KHHVWLPDWHV DUH QRQHWKHOHVV EXQFKHG DURXQG WKH µFRQVHQVXV¶ RI  ,W LV HYLGHQFH RIWKLVQDWXUHWKDWOHG%ODQFKIORZHUDQG2VZDOGWRFRQFOXGHWKDW³(YHU\FRXQWU\VHHPVWRKDYHDµZDJHFXUYH¶´S
Some empirical studies reject this conclusion, but they form a small minority.
For example, Albaek et al. (1999) found no stable negative relation between wages
and unemployment across regions in the Nordic labour markets once regional fixed
6 Morrison et al. (2002), who formulate a labour turnover cost model, provide a recent exception.
7 6SHFLILFDOO\ WKH\HVWLPDWHGZDJHFXUYHVZLWKGDWD IURPFRXQWULHV86$%ULWDLQ&DQDGD6RXWK.RUHD$XVWULD,WDO\+ROODQG6ZLW]HUODQG1RUZD\,UHODQG$XVWUDOLDDQG*HUPDQ\
5effects are accounted for. Partridge and Rickman (1997) found evidence of an upward
sloping wage curve.
An important result in the literature is that the unemployment elasticity of pay
varies across different groups. Card (1995, Table 4) finds that the elasticity is greater
for males than for females, for the lower rather than the higher educated, among the
young rather than old, for non-union members rather than union members, and in the
private rather than the public sector. Subsequent research has more or less confirmed
these observations. For example, Baltagi and Blien (1998) found with German data
that the wage curve is more elastic for unskilled workers, for younger workers and for
males. Janssens and Konings (1998) find a wage curve for males but none for females
in Belgium. However, there are exceptions: for example, Kennedy and Borland
(2000) reported that in Australia female earnings were more responsive to the
unemployment rate than male earnings.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) offer three possible explanations for the
wage curve. A negative relationship between unemployment and wages could, they
argue, be supported by a labour contract model, an efficiency wage model or a
bargaining model. A summary and assessment of these contenders is given by Card
(1995).7KH ODERXU FRQWUDFWPRGHOPDNHV WKH FUXFLDO DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW UHJLRQV GLIIHU LQDPHQLW\ YDOXHV EXW WKDW WKH µRXWVLGH RSWLRQ¶ ZKLFK ODLGRII ZRUNHUV IDFH WKHXQHPSOR\PHQW EHQHILW RU WKH UHVHUYDWLRQ ZDJH LV HTXDO DFURVV UHJLRQV )LUPV DQGZRUNHUV DJUHH RQ D VWDWHFRQWLQJHQW ZDJH OHYHO DQG D VWDWHFRQWLQJHQW HPSOR\PHQWOHYHO DORQJ WKH OLQHV RI WKH VWDQGDUG $]DULDGLV  DQG %DLO\  LPSOLFLWFRQWUDFWVPRGHO+LJKHUZDJHVZLOO WKHQFRLQFLGHZLWKDKLJKHU OHYHORI FRQWUDFWXDOHPSOR\PHQW WR FRPSHQVDWH IRU WKH KLJKHU LQFRPH ULVN $WWUDFWLYH UHJLRQV ZLOO EHEXQFKHG DW RXWFRPHV FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ ORZ ORQJUXQ ZDJHV ZLWK KLJK ORQJUXQXQHPSOR\PHQW+RZHYHUDVQRWHGE\&DUGDQGE\%ODQFKIORZHUDQG2VZDOG WKHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFH LVQRWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKVRPHRI WKHSUHGLFWLRQVRI WKLVWKHRU\7KHUHLVVRPHHYLGHQFHWKDWORQJUXQZDJHVDQGWKHORQJUXQXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHVDUHSRVLWLYHO\ UHODWHG VHHHJ+DOO5H]DDQGPRUH UHFHQWO\3DSSV  DQG %HOO HW DO  7KH ZDJH FXUYH LQ FRQWUDVW LV D VKRUWUXQSKHQRPHQRQ
A more promising alternative is a union bargaining model. This model, which
originated with a contribution by De Menil (1971), generates a wage equation of the
6form w = a + s S/n. Here, w is the negotiated wage available to union workers, a is the
expected ‘alternative’ wage in the non-union sector, S/n is the level of profits per
worker and s is a relative bargaining power parameter. Because a will decrease with
increasing rates of unemployment, a wage curve results. Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994) provide some supporting micro-level evidence for this theory. Nonetheless, the
wage curve appears less elastic for union workers than for non-union workers and the
curve is also less elastic in highly unionised countries (Card 1995; Albaek et al.
1999). Both facts contradict the union bargaining model. However, since the wage
curve is a model of the local labour market, we would expect that its slope depends on
the geographic coverage of collective bargaining: less elastic in the case where wages
are determined nationally, economy-wide or by industry, and more elastic with
enterprise-based bargaining. Buettner and Fiztenberger (2001) provide recent support
for this conjecture by means of (West) German data.
The third wage curve theory builds on the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984). Employers, who can imperfectly monitor workers’ productivity, will
offer a wage that will discourage workers from shirking. Because the expected
penalty for shirking, when detected, is greater when it becomes harder to find a job,
firms can offer a lower wage premium during times of high unemployment.
This shirking model has, as noted by Card (1995), various advantages over the
two other models. Firstly, it suggests that a short-run inverse correlation between
wages and unemployment rates is not inconsistent with a long-run positive cross-
sectional association between expected regional wages and unemployment rates that
was argued on the grounds of an equilibrium ‘compensating differential’ by Harris
and Todaro (1970). An additional advantage of this theory is that it leads to the
testable hypothesis that a group-specific unemployment rate should be a better
predictor of group-specific wages than the average regional unemployment rate. This
hypothesis can be tested to the extent that group-specific regional unemployment rates
can be observed. Thirdly, since the shirking model is likely to be more relevant in
relatively non-unionised economies, the model predicts that a decline in unionisation
(at least to the extent that collective bargaining occurs at the national or industry
level) should lead to a more elastic wage curve. As noted above, this is consistent
with evidence reported in the literature.
In contrast to the models of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994), wherein firms attempt to minimize the costs attributable to shirking
7workers, Campbell and Orszag (1998) formulated an explanation for the wage curve
by means of a model of lump-sum labour turnover costs that is based on Salop (1979)
and Phelps (1994). In this model, firms in low unemployment regions economize on
the costs associated with hiring new workers by paying higher wages in order to
discourage existing workers from quitting. An extension of this model, that also
incorporates the impact of interregional migration on the incidence of monopsony in
local labour markets, was recently formulated and empirically confirmed by Morrison
et al. (2002).8
Yet another alternative theory is that of a simple search model proposed by
Sato (2000), who shows that as long as there are productivity differentials across local
labour markets, those with the higher productivity have higher equilibrium wages and
lower unemployment rates. Spatial real wage differentials persist because higher
productivity regions have larger populations that result in offsetting congestion costs
(commuting costs and land rent).
Finally, it has been argued that the wage curve may be the result of
misspecification in regression analysis: it could be a misspecified Phillips curve (with
wage levels rather than wage changes on the left hand side) or a misspecified labour
supply curve (with unemployment acting as a proxy for labour force participation).
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) consider and reject both these conjectures. Despite
Card’s (1995) call for further tests of these possibilities, little has been published on
this issue, possibly because of the common use of pooled cross sections rather than
true panels in this literature.9
3. A meta-analytic comparison
Given the variety of results that was alluded to in the previous section, we will now
systematically investigate any potential causes of observed variations in wage curve
elasticities across studies. Figure 1 shows the ‘life cycle’ of this literature in terms of
the number of documents recorded in EconLit. The first recorded working paper
became available in 1989. The literature peaked in the mid 1990s, following the
8 Local labour markets are defined as markets which can only be entered or exited by incurring
migration costs, i.e. there is no commuting between them. This assumption is unlikely to have been
satisfied in all wage curve studies, but holds quite well in New Zealand, where the distances between
the 30 urban areas that were defined as local labour markets are generally too large to permit
commuting between these.
9 Using two sources of U.S. data, Card and Hyslop (1997) find support for the local labour market
variant of the Phillips curve rather than the wage curve. In contrast,  Bell et al. (2002) recently rejected
the Phillips curve in favour of the wage curve, using U.K. New Earnings Survey data for 1976-1997.
8publication of Blanchflower and Oswald’s book on the topic in 1994.  Many of the
recorded documents are working papers that appeared in more than one working
paper series or papers that do refer to the wage curve but do not carry out any new
empirical analyses.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
For the present synthesis of this literature, seventeen wage curve studies that
appeared between 1990 and 2001 were selected. All the EconLit articles, published in
refereed journals during these years, that calculated new wage curve estimates by
means of cross-section or panel data, are included. These studies are: Blanchflower
and Oswald (1990), Groot et al. (1992), Wagner (1994), Bratsberg and Turunen
(1996), Winter-Ebmer (1996), Partridge and Rickman (1997), Baltagi and Blien
(1998), Janssens and Konings (1998), Pannenberg and Schwartze (1998), Buettner
(1999), Morrison and Poot (1999), Kennedy and Borland (2000), Papps (2001) and
Blanchflower (2001). A large number of wage curve estimates was also collected
from Blanchflower and Oswald’s 1994 book. With respect to as yet unpublished
papers, we included Albaek et al. (1999) and Blanchflower (2001) to increase even
further the range of countries for which estimates were obtained. However, the
emphasis on articles in refereed journals is deliberate: peer review is the only directly
measurable form of quality control.
Nonetheless, our sample covers the majority of countries and data sets by
means of which wage curve analysis has been undertaken. The seventeen studies
generated several hundred wage curve estimates. Selection of meta-analytic
observations among these depends on the availability of a range of pre-determined
study characteristics that relate to interesting issues with respect to the wage curve
(such as the use of grouped versus micro data, gender effects, the role of unions, etc.).
In addition, observations were selected for being ‘interesting’ in that they provided
sufficient variation in the levels of each of the study characteristics that are potential
covariates in a meta-regression model.  Using these criteria, 208 meta-observations
were obtained.10 As many as 97 of these were derived from Blanchflower and
Oswald’s 1994 book, as these authors themselves put much emphasis on replication
and re-analysis. Adding also some estimates reported in Blanchflower and Oswald
10 A copy of the spreadsheet that contains the data can be requested by e-mail.
9(1990) and by Blanchflower (2001), 62.5 percent of the meta-observations in our set
came from the studies by one or both of these authors. This can be seen from Table 1,
which provides descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the studies in the sample.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The number of observations used in the wage curve equations varied
enormously. The smallest number was 36 (a regression by Albaek et al. 1999 for
Finland using grouped data for 12 regions and three time periods), while the largest
number was 1,534,093. The latter meta-observation came from a CPS micro data set
for the USA (1963-87) used by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).  The number of
regions used in the studies varied between 4 and 1395. A number of studies used only
cross-sectional data, but where cross sections were pooled, a maximum of 25 time
periods (between 1963 and 1998) was available. The micro-level data needed for this
type of research have generally only become available with the advent of faster
computers and abundant electronic storage.
Nonetheless, 27.4 percent of the studies used grouped variables (for example,
the average wage of female workers in region i at time t), as individual records are not
always accessible to the researcher, for confidentiality or cost reasons. Wage curves
estimated with grouped data have in fact the advantage that they do not exaggerate the
precision of the estimates of the elasticity (Moulton, 1990).
As estimation of the wage curve builds on the tradition of the earnings
function, as first developed by Mincer (1974), it is not surprising that much attention
has been paid to human capital characteristics of the workers. All but 9.1 percent of
the studies used some measure of education or skill, while 88.9 percent included an
age or experience variable. Industry information was somewhat more common than
occupation (67.9 percent versus 47.6 percent).
Because many studies adopted a pooled cross-section time-series approach, it
is natural to investigate a role for location and time fixed effects (51.0 percent and
62.5 percent respectively). While such dummy variables are often significant, their
interpretation is usually problematic as there may be a number of independent
influences leading to such fixed effects.
Although the wage curve is a relationship between the real wage and local
unemployment, only 8 out of the 208 studies (3.8 percent) take spatial variation in the
10
cost of living into account. This may be due to the difficulty in obtaining regional cost
of living indexes.
As was noted earlier, wage curves may not be present if countries are highly
unionised and bargaining takes place at the national level. On the other hand, a
prevalence of union influence at the local level may be indicative of a non-
competitive local labour market where the bargaining relationship between the firms
and unions does lead to an inverse relationship between wages and unemployment.
36.1 percent of the meta-observations in our sample contain a dummy variable to test
whether union membership has an explicit effect on the wage level. A smaller subset
of meta observations (17.8 percent) reports wage curve elasticities for males only.
Card (1995) suggested that where the actual relationship that was tested by
means of regression is one between annual earnings and the unemployment rate, the
observed elasticity might be due to the decline in hours worked as unemployment
increases in recessions, rather than a response of the hourly wage. Only just under a
quarter of studies control for this by estimating hourly earnings equations.
In assessing the relationship between wages and unemployment rates, one
needs to consider the issue of simultaneity. The wage curve estimates the effect of
unemployment rates on individual earnings, but pay levels could also affect labour
demand and supply, and therefore unemployment. However, in micro level data sets it
can be argued that the wage negotiated between a specific worker and an individual
firm may be influenced by the local unemployment rate, but the micro outcome is
unlikely to have a feedback effect on the unemployment rate itself (a macro variable).
This may explain that less than 10 percent of the studies use instrumental variables to
control for endogeneity of the unemployment rate and used OLS as the estimation
technique instead.
One issue that is often ignored by researchers is the functional form of the
relationship, for which theory may provide little guidance. Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994) come to the conclusion that empirically the most supported relationship is one
of constant elasticity: ln w = a + b ln U + other variables. The validity of this has been
tested in 14.9 percent of the sampled studies by means of adding additional ln U
powers.
If the wage curve provides evidence of non-competitive behaviour in local
labour markets, one would expect the wage curve elasticity to be smaller in labour
markets that are considered to be relatively competitive and where workers exhibit a
relatively high degree of labour mobility. As the U.S. labour market may be
11
considered to be one of the most competitive among OECD countries, we will
investigate whether there is an effect of the country on which the study is based (USA
versus non-USA observations). Of our 208 wage curve estimates, 18.3 percent
originated from the USA.
It can be seen from Table 1 that the observed unemployment elasticity of pay
varies in our sample between -1.43 and 0.09. The mean estimate is -0.1184, which is
quite close to the reported economic ‘law’ of an elasticity of -0.1. Figure 2 shows the
histogram of the distribution. It is clear from Figure 2 that the distribution is quite
skewed to the left. The mode is -0.06 and the median is -0.086.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Among the elasticities, there are three outliers clearly visible in Figure 2. All
three refer to wage curve regressions carried out by Blanchflower and Oswald. The
rather extreme elasticities of -1.43, -1.02 and -0.79 resulted from wage curves
estimated with Irish, U.K. and U.S. data respectively. They have in common that the
estimates with obtained with micro data sets with a relatively small number of
observations.
Compared with other meta-analyses in economics, the wage curve research
has the advantage that the effect sizes across different studies are all elasticities, as the
wage curves have all been estimated in loglinear form. In empirical economics there
is often an emphasis on innovation and studies can vary considerably in terms of the
definitions of variables and the functional form of the model. In contrast, the effect
sizes and their standard errors are in our case directly comparable. As a starting point
we can therefore combine the effect sizes along the lines proposed by e.g. Shadish and
Haddock (1994). Such combinations take into account that a weighted average of the
observed effect sizes, with weights inversely proportional to the estimated variances
in each study, has a smaller variance than the unweighted mean.
When combining effect sizes, a distinction between a fixed effect (FE) and a
random effects (RE) model can be made. Some notation is helpful here.  Consider k =
1, 2, ..., K wage curve studies. Each study involves estimating a regression equation
by means of  i = 1, 2, ..., IK individuals (or groups), located in one of j = 1, 2, ..., JK
local labour markets, and observed at times  t = 1, 2, ..., TK.  All wage curve studies
can be described by the following regression model
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where NLMWZOQ is the natural logarithm of the observed wage of individual (or group) i
in local labour market j at time t, used in study k, NLMW[ is a vector of characteristics of
the individual or group, NMW\ is a vector of characteristics of local labour market and
NLMWX is the unemployment rate in j relevant to individual i (aggregate or group-
specific). The general model also allows for location or time fixed effects.
We observe the estimates b1, b2, ..., bK of the wage curve elasticities E1, E2, ...,EK, with estimated variances v1, v2, ..., vK.  Under the FE model we assume E1 = E2 =
... = EK = E, a common effect size. Then the weighted average effect size of the K
studies is calculated as
¦¦   NL L
.
L LL
Y
YEE

  (2)
The weighted average effect size E  has estimated variance Y , with
¦  NL LYY   (3)
The latter can be used to construct a 95 percent confidence interval for the
wage curve elasticity in the usual way. A test of the hypothesis that studies do in fact
share a common population effect size, uses the following homogeneity statistic
(Shadish and Haddock 1994, p.266):
   ¦ »¼º«¬ª  .L LL YEE4    (4)
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If Q exceeds the upper-tail critical value of the chi-square distribution with K-
1 degrees of freedom, the observed variance in estimated wage curve elasticities is
considerably greater than what we would expect by chance if all studies shared the
same ‘true’ wage curve elasticity. When within-study sample sizes are very large, as
they are in most of the wage curve studies, Q is likely to be rejected even when the
individual effect sizes do not differ much, particularly when we have a large sample
of studies (208 observations in our case). The best way then to account for
heterogeneity is to use regression techniques, as we will do in the next section.
Alternatively, we can account for heterogeneity to some extent by the use of
the RE model.   In this case, the ‘true’ elasticity Ei  of study i is assumed to
distributed with mean E and variance LL YY V E , where EV represents the between-
studies variance and LY represents the within-study variance. It can be shown (e.g.
Shadish and Haddock 1994, p.274) that an unbiased estimate of EV is given by
   ¦¦ ¦    E »»¼º««¬ª ¸¸¹·¨¨©§ V .L L.L .L LL Y...EE   Ö (5)
The weighted mean elasticity and its estimated variance can then be computed
by replacing LY  by LY in equations (2) and (3).
Table 2 reports the results of estimating the FE and RE models under the
homogeneity assumption. The three outlier observations have been excluded. This
makes the mean elasticity somewhat smaller. Table 2 shows that the simple mean is
now indeed strikingly close to the -0.1 consensus estimate. The weighted mean
elasticity of -0.0571 for the FE model and -0.0855 for the RE model are smaller than
the unweighted one. Large elasticities tend to coincide with large variances (and
therefore large standard deviations). We shall see in the next section that this is partly
due to an ‘unusually’ large number of cases in which t statistics are bunched around 2,
i.e. due to publication bias. In the RE model, the weighted elasticity is closer to the
unweighted one than in the FE model. However, the 95 percent confidence interval is,
by design, much wider in the RE model (but the weighted means of the FE model lies
outside the confidence intervals of the RE model).
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
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As expected, given the large meta-analytic sample and the heterogeneity
between studies in terms of the specification of Equation (1), the Q statistics are very
large. Even with the RE model, the statistic is significant at the 1 percent level.
One cause of heterogeneity is the distinction between studies that use data on
individuals and studies that use grouped data. The mean elasticity among the latter is
much smaller than among the former. This is the case for both the unweighted and
weighted means. The estimate of the between-studies variance in the RE model, Ö EV ,
is a little smaller among the studies using grouped data.
Using micro data permits estimation of the wage curve with greater precision,
although the concurrent use of grouped labour market characteristics on the right hand
side of the equation leads to the standard error on the unemployment rate being
significantly underestimated (Moulton 1990, Card 1995) and, hence, the precision
being exaggerated.11
Thus, wage curve studies using micro data may show large t statistics due to
two types of bias: discarding estimates with small t statistics because these are
unlikely to be publishable (the file-drawer bias) and the statistical problem of
estimating equations with earnings data on individuals, but explained by local labour
market characteristics related to groups. In the next section, we will suggest a method
to trim observations with ‘unusually’ large t statistics from the sample.
Table 3 provides additional information on average wage curve elasticities for
sub-groups. The outliers are now included. Here, we simply report the unweighted
means, but the differences would also carry across to weighted means. As the three
outliers were all studies with data on individuals, the mean for studies with grouped
data remains -0.0498, as compared with the now greater elasticity of -0.1443 for the
studies with data on individuals.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
An interesting question is the extent to which there is an advocacy effect in
Blanchflower and Oswald’s results. Since these authors were the first to
systematically investigate this phenomenon, one might expect that their reported
research would be more supportive than other papers on the subject. Table 3 shows
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that there appears to be indeed an advocacy effect: Blanchflower and Oswald’s own
mean estimate across a wide range of countries is about -0.15 (and thus greater than
the ‘stylised’ value of -0.1), while the average of estimates made by others is a more
modest value of -0.07. The difference is statistically significant.
Table 3 also shows that the introduction of location-fixed effects appears to
take away some of the effect of unemployment in the determination of local wages,
although the difference is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Card
(1995) noted that in the U.S. the opposite is true: wage curve elasticities there tend to
be larger in magnitude when locational dummies are included.
The inclusion of time fixed effects does not appear to influence the elasticity.
Interestingly, studies that do not calculate gender-specific elasticities find a greater
elasticity than regression equations that concern the elasticity for males only. This
contradicts with evidence reported in the previous section that the wage curve appears
more elastic for males than for females, but may be due to other study characteristics
that are not simultaneously controlled for here. The difference is significant at the 5
percent level.
Table 3 confirms the effect predicted by Card (1995) that the wage curve is
partly a phenomenon of working hours varying with the business cycle: the curve is
indeed less elastic (-0.0628 on average) in hourly earnings equations than in annual
earnings equations (-0.1365).
Wage curves appear more elastic when differences in local price levels are
ignored (-0.1203 compared with -0.0711). It is possible that the wage curve simply
picks up business cycle variation in local prices, to which nominal wages respond,
with local prices of non-traded goods being high at times when the local economy is
buoyant. The effect is not statistically significant, but note the small number of
observations (eight) derived from studies that took cost of living differentials into
account.
Interestingly, wage curve studies that incorporated a variable for the presence
or membership of unions did find a more elastic wage curve (and the difference is
statistically significant). If wage curves are a measure of local rents due to monopsony
power among employers, such rents may generate a stronger union presence. Perhaps
the union variable is an indicator of the labour market being less competitive and
wage curves are more elastic in such labour markets.
11 Card (1995, footnote 7) suggests a two-step procedure to compute correct standard errors for the
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Studies that control for potential endogeneity of unemployment do find, as can
be expected, a lower wage curve elasticity than OLS studies (-0.0641 and -0.1233
respectively) and the difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Considering a nonlinear relationship between the natural logarithm of earnings and
the logarithm of the unemployment rate U has a huge impact on the elasticity (the row
for ln U powers in Table 3), and the difference is also statistically significant. Thus,
there is some support for Blanchflower and Oswald’s expectation that the elasticity
may be lower at high rates of unemployment. However, goodness of fit tests have
tended to support the more parsimonious constant elasticity relationship.
As noted above, if the wage curve reflects evidence of non-competitiveness in
local labour markets, it could be argued that the wage curve elasticities should be less
(in absolute value) for studies on the USA, which has a very competitive labour
market, than for studies in other countries. However, Table 3 shows that there is no
such effect on average.
The bottom half of Table 3 shows that the estimated wage curve elasticities do
vary considerably between countries. Small elasticities are found for South Korea and
for most continental western European countries. Among the latter, exceptions are
The Netherlands, Italy, East Germany and Switzerland. Blanchflower (2001)
estimated recently wage curves for ex-Communist countries of Eastern Europe and
found those curves to be generally more elastic than for western economies, thus
reconfirming earlier evidence on the difference between the former East Germany
(see Pannenberg and Schwartze 1998, Baltagi et al. 2000) and West Germany
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1994, Wagner 1994, Baltagi and Blien 1998, Buettner
1999). The Anglo-Saxon countries have also relatively greater wage curve elasticities.
Ireland (as noted before), and to a lesser extent Latvia, appear clear outliers.
To what extent are our findings on the wage curve elasticity sensitive to
publication bias? We first apply two simple tests for publication bias proposed by
Card and Krueger (1995). Figure 3 displays the relationship between the t statistics of
the studies and the square root of the number of observations. Standard statistical
theory suggests that these two statistics should be proportional. This implies that a
regression of ln t on ln Q should have a slope of one. The regression line displayed
in Figure 3 has in fact a slope coefficient of only 0.535 (ln t = -1.099 + 0.535 ln Q ,
with R2 = 0.23). This indicates that the studies with small numbers of observations
unemployment elasticity of pay.
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have been reporting wage curve equations with unusually high t statistics. This
suggests that there is some publication bias in this literature in that specification
searches appear to have led to the reporting of too many equations with significant
unemployment effects in wage determination.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Another test of publication bias is inspection of a scatter plot of the wage
curve elasticities and their standard errors. This scatter plot is given in Figure 4. A
regression line has also been estimated. Here the line is given by elasticity = -0.07 +
1.28 x standard error of elasticity, with R2=0.43). In the absence of any selective
reporting this line should be horizontal, as the estimated wage curve elasticity should
not vary in proportion to its standard error. However, if there is a tendency only to
report results where the t-ratio is around 2 or greater, the estimated elasticity will
increase as the standard error increases in order to maintain a t ratio at or above 2.
Over all estimates in our meta-analysis, we find a significantly positive slope of 1.28.
Interestingly, the intercept of this relationship (-0.07) turns out to be the unbiased
overall estimate of the wage curve, as will be shown in the next section.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
A final way of identifying publication bias is to do a so-called funnel plot (see
also Duval and Tweedie 2000). This plot is a scatter diagram of the log of the square
root of the number of observations in each study against the wage curve elasticity.
Figure 5 provides this plot for the wage curve studies. If all studies were drawn from
the same population, a funnel shape should emerge, as the smaller samples yield
wider confidence intervals for the wage curve elasticity. Figure 5 shows that the range
of estimates becomes wider for smaller n, but the estimates come closer again for very
small samples. These sub samples are actually based on grouped data and generate
one type of heterogeneity in our overall sample. Once the studies based on grouped
data are removed, the funnel shape does show up, as can be seen from Figure 6.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
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Note, however, the asymmetry within the funnel plot. Figure 6 is the basis for
making a correction for publication bias in the meta-regression model of the next
section. Without publication bias, a symmetric funnel shape would emerge with a
vertical line of symmetry at the location of the true parameter. Publication bias shows
up in the asymmetry in Figure 6. Methods to ‘fill in the missing studies’ in Figure 6
are still being developed. In the next section we consider two such methods.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
4. Correcting publication and aggregation bias
Hedges (1992) proposed a formal model of publication bias that attempts to
estimate the probability that a study is observed. The key variable is the p-value that is
associated with each parameter estimate, whereby studies with a lower p-value are
more likely to be observed. Using the notation of the previous section, consider again
the estimates b1, b2, ..., bK of the wage curve elasticities E1, E2, ..., EK.
We assume now that the observed data are such that a LL 1E VG ,
where LV is assumed known (estimated by the regression standard error) and G is an
unknown parameter distributed as a VG ']1 where z is a vector of study
characteristics and  V reflects unsystematic heterogeneity. Hence a LL 1E K']
where KVV   L .  This model is clearly an extension of the RE model of the
previous section, in which the ‘true’ elasticity can now also vary with study
characteristics.
Following Ashenfelter et al. (1999), we assume that there is a weight function
w(bi) (based on observed p-values) that determines the probability that a study is
observed. The weight attached to the probability that the study is observed when 0 < p
< 0.01, is set equal to one.  The relative probabilities that studies are observed with
0.01 < p < 0.05, or p > 0.05 is given by Z and  Z respectively. In the absence of
publication bias, Z and  Z should be unity also. The overall pooled estimate of the
wage curve elasticity is denoted by the constant term in the vector '. The
heterogeneity in wage curve estimates in indicated by the other elements of ' that
represent the coefficients of the study characteristics z. It can be shown that the
likelihood function to be maximized is then as follows:
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where  V'NNO ]% is the probability that a normally distributed random variable with
mean zk' and variance NK will be assigned weight value OZ .
The maximum likelihood estimates without covariates are given at the top of
Table 4, those with covariates follow further below.  The top left panel shows that, as
expected, studies with p-values greater than 0.01 or 0.05 are less likely to be reported
than studies with highly significant wage curve elasticities (the probabilities are about
half and one quarter respectively, relative to the p < 0.01 category).12 The consensus
wage curve estimate is now -0.077.  However, the unexplained heterogeneity among
studies is great relative to the mean, as indicated by V = 0.07, which is much greater
than the estimate of 0.03 in the simple RE model of the previous section.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The restricted model assumes that there is no publication bias, in which case
Z = Z = 1. Minus twice the difference in the log likelihood ratio has a Chi-square
(2) distributed. The value is here 21.2, compared with a critical value of 9.21 at the 1
percent level. Hence the null hypothesis of no publication bias is clearly rejected.
It is useful to distinguish again between studies in terms of the use of grouped
or individual level data. Table 4 also reports maximum likelihood estimates for the
case of data on individuals. It is clear that the wage curve elasticity is greater for the
latter type of study (-0.077 versus -0.089), which confirms the significant difference
we already detected in Tables 2 and 3. Again, the null hypothesis of no publication
bias is also rejected for the sub sample of ‘unit record’ studies.
12 Naturally, we would expect  ÖÖ ZZ !! . This is indeed the case throughout Table 4. In contrast,
Ashenfelter et al. (1999) found Ö !Z , although not significantly so.
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The lower part of Table 4 shows that several study characteristics turn out to
have a significant effect on the underlying ‘true’ elasticity. Six covariates are
considered: the natural logarithm of the square root of the number of observations and
dummy variables indication whether studies were done by Blanchflower and Oswald,
used data on individuals, controlled for hours worked, included a union membership
variable, or allowed for a varying wage curve elasticity (by including powers of ln u).
Several study covariates are significant. Setting these at their mean level, an
overall elasticity of -0.072 results. This may be interpreted as the publication-bias
corrected overall estimate of the wage curve elasticity.
Taking into account that the wage curve elasticity is negative, the wage curve
becomes less negative (i.e. less elastic) when studies use greater samples (due to the
positive coefficient on ln root number of observations). Smaller micro samples have
tended to yield more elastic wage curves.
However, in the multivariate model there appears to be no longer a
Blanchflower and Oswald advocacy effect. As noted already in the discussion of
Tables 2 and 3, and above, the wage curve is a micro-level phenomenon: the elasticity
is much greater for studies using data on individuals rather than grouped data. This
can be seen from the significance of the negative coefficient ' LQ WKH PRGHOZLWKFRYDULDWHV IRUDOOVWXGLHVDQGWKHHVWLPDWHRI ' RI  LQ WKHVXEVDPSOHRIXQLWUHFRUGVWXGLHV
Moreover, the meta-regression model also confirms the significant effect of
considering hourly earnings rather than annual earnings. Estimates based on hourly
wage data show a lesser effect of unemployment than studies based on annual
earnings data.
A significant effect (but only at the 10 percent level) can be found for the
presence of a union membership variable in wage curve regressions (which yields a
more elastic wage curve), but not for non-linearity (ln U powers). Again, the
hypothesis of no publication bias is rejected (the test statistic is 10.74). The union
effect is greater among the sub sample of studies using individual level data. The
effect of data on hourly or annual wages is no longer significant among these studies.
Another method for controlling for publication bias involved the deleting of
observations which are clear outliers in terms of the estimated elasticity, or which
have ‘unusually’ large t statistics. This can be assessed by a histogram of ln t - ln root
n (recall also Figure 2 on the relationship between ln t and ln root n). Figure 7a shows
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that this distribution appears bimodal: there are too many observations with high t
values.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
First we control for heterogeneity by omitting the estimates based on grouped
data. Next, by deleting these observations with exaggerated t statistics, as well as
some outliers of the wage curve elasticity, the histogram in Figure 7b results. This is a
trimmed sample of 73 observations.
Figure 8 shows that this trimming has removed much of the asymmetry in the
funnel plot.13 The mean estimate of the elasticity for the trimmed sample was about -
0.066. This may be interpreted as an alternative publication bias corrected estimate of
the wage curve elasticity. The similarity with the estimate derived with the maximum
likelihood method discussed above is striking.
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
5. Conclusions
Having quantitatively synthesized a rapidly expanding body of literature, what
then has this study contributed? Our primary aim was to investigate the role that the
local unemployment rate plays in the determination of workers’ wages. When
considered alongside human capital variables, like education and job experience, the
unemployment rate may be regarded as a comparatively minor source of variation in
earnings. Nonetheless, differences in the level of responsiveness across groups of
workers or time periods can potentially provide a better insight into the important
determinants of local labour market outcomes.
We carried out modern meta-analytic techniques on a sample of 208 elasticities
derived from the literature to uncover the reasons for the differences in empirical
results across studies. Without repeating the underlying micro-economic research and
by simply deploying meta-regression analysis it was found that the wage curve is a
robust empirical phenomenon, but there is also clear evidence of publication bias.
There is indeed an uncorrected mean estimate of about -0.1 for the elasticity. After
controlling for publication bias by means of two different methods, we estimate that
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the ‘true’ wage curve elasticity at the means of study characteristics is no more than -
0.07. This still hides an effect on hours worked. Using the model of the previous
section, it can be estimated that the relationship between local unemployment and the
hourly wage has an elasticity of about -0.05. These are useful stylised facts for macro
simulation models.
We also found that the wage curve phenomenon is exaggerated by micro level
studies with relatively small samples. Finally, ignoring the extent to which unions
play a role in local wage bargaining makes the wage curve less elastic.
It is clear that the wage curve has prompted a wave of fascinating research on
local labour markets. This paper should by no means be the ‘last word’ on the wage
curve. Our quantitative literature survey has revealed many weak and strong elements
in that research. Ultimately meta-analysis is an effective aid for setting the direction
for further research on the complex relationship between wages and unemployment
rates on a given local labour market. In this respect, our findings suggest that further
explicit tests of local monopsony models and institutional factors (such as local
bargaining arrangements) are likely to shed further light on the heterogeneity in wage
curve studies.
13 An alternative way to remove the asymmetry in the funnel plot is the ‘trim and fill’ procedure
proposed by Duval and Tweedie (2000).
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$JHRU([SHULHQFH 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Table 2 Combining estimates of the wage curve elasticity
sample
size
mean weighted
mean
95% confidence
interval
Ö EV Q
Fixed Effect
Model
All
observations
205 -0.1044 -0.0571 (-0.0580,-0.0563) 0 6866 a
Grouped data 57 -0.0498 -0.0140 (-0.0164,-0.0116) 0 569 a
Data on
individuals
148 -0.1254 -0.0633 (-0.0642,-0.0624) 0 4919 a
Random
Effects Model
All
observations
205 -0.1044 -0.0855 (-0.0919,-0.0791) 0.0381 547 a
Grouped data 57 -0.0498 -0.0408 (-0.0510,-0.0306) 0.0311 89 a
Data on
individuals
148 -0.1254 -0.1022 (-0.1094,-0.0951) 0.0350 451 a
a Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3 The effects of study characteristics on wage curve elasticities
:LWKRXW IHDWXUH :LWK IHDWXUH 'LIIHUHQFHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWDW"Q 0HDQ 6WG'HY Q 0HDQ 6WG'HY
'DWDRQ,QGLYLGXDOV       \HV
%ODQFKIORZHU	2VZDOG       \HV
/RFDWLRQ)L[HG(IIHFWV       QR
7LPH)L[HG(IIHFWV       QR
0DOHVRQO\       \HV
+RXUV:RUNHG       \HV
5HJLRQDO&RVWRI/LYLQJ       QR
8QLRQV       \HV
2/6       \HV
OQ8SRZHUV       \HV
'DWDIURP86$       QR
14 Equal variances were only assumed when indicated by Levene’s test.
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Table 4 Publication-bias corrected estimates of the unemployment elasticity of pay:
Ashenfelter et al. (1999) procedure
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Figure 1 The number of EconLit documents on the wage curve
Source: EconLit (as at 24 January 2003)
Figure 2 The distribution of wage curve elasticities
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Figure 3 The relationship between the study t-statistics and the number of
observations
Figure 4 The relationship between the elasticities and standard errors
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Figure 5 Funnel plot, all observations
Figure 6   Funnel plot of unit record studies, n = 151
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Figure 7 Histogram of (ln t - ln root n) for total sample and trimmed sample
(a) total sample
(b) trimmed sample
OQWOQURRWQ





6WG'HY 0HDQ 1 
OQWOQURRWQ










6WG'HY 0HDQ 1 
36
Figure 8 Funnel plot of trimmed sample, n = 73
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